Nuisance or Negligence: A Study in the Tyranny of Labels by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 3 Article 10
Spring 1949
Nuisance or Negligence: A Study in the Tyranny of
Labels
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




A STUDY IN THE TYRANNY OF LABELS
If it is possible to add further confusion to the chaos
surrounding the concept of nuisance,' the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut has done so in a line of cases, the most
recent example of which is De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury.2
On a rainy night plaintiff De Lahunta, driving south
on the inner lane of a four-lane highway, struck a concrete
"silent policeman" erected and maintained by the defendant
City of Waterbury at a street intersection. The base of the
stanchion was well illuminated and from its top an amber
light flashed in the direction from which De Lahunta was
coming. But instead of being located in the exact center of
the highway, the stanchion had been erected near the center
of the lane in which De Lahunta was driving. He sought
recovery on the theory of nuisance. At the trial there was
some evidence that he had been drinking at the time of the
accident.2 From an adverse verdict and judgment, De La-
hunta appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in
charging the jury that contributory negligence was a de-
fense. The Supreme Court of Errors agreed with this con-
tention and reversed the judgment, holding that the nuis-
ance did not arise out of negligence and that therefore con-
tributory negligence was not relevant.
Despite the court's holding, the facts present what clearly
amounts to negligence in planning and design on the part
of the city.4 If this is true, the result of the court's position
is that liability may well depend not upon the facts alleged
1. "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance'." PROSSER, TORTS 549
(1941).
2. 59 A.2d 800 (Conn. 1948). See also Beckwith v. Town of Strat-
ford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775 (1942); Bacon v. Town of Rocky
Hill, 126 Conn. 402, 11 A.2d 399 (1940); Hoffman v. City of Bristol,
113 Conn. 386, 155 At1. 499 (1931). See Mignone, Nuisance and Negli-
gence, 11 CONN. B. J. 209 (1937).
3. Brief for Appellee, pp. 40, 41, De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury,
59 A.2d 800. (Conn. 1948).
4. Negligence can exist in planning and design as well as in the
physical doing of an act. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,
166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir. 1948); Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine
Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916); 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 398
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in the complaint but upon whether the plaintiff labels his
tort action as one of "nuisance" or "negligence." 5  Incon-
sistent results have often been reached when courts have
wandered into the maze surrounding the concept of nuisance
in deciding cases which could have been decided upon other
general rules of torts applicable to injuries to person and
chattels.8 The important problem to be considered is whether
reference to nuisance concepts in such cases is necessary or
even warranted.
Since the early period of the common law the word
"nuisance" has encompassed two separate but often over-
lapping concepts, private and public nuisance.7 Private nuis-
ance was always a tort related to "an unlawful interference
with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or of some right
over, or in connection with, it."8 Public nuisance, on the
other hand, included any "act not warranted by law, or
omission to discharge a legal duty, which inconveniences the
public in the exercise of rights common to all. . ... 9 Since
the plaintiff in the De Lahunta case is obviously not com-
plaining of any interference with the use or enjoyment of
his own land, the condition created by the city is a public
(1934). In Connecticut a municipality is made liable by statute for
defects in the streets. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2126 (1949).
It is interesting to note that the court in the De Lahunta case
analyzed the facts as if it were attempting to find a failure to use due
care, then proceeded to hold that the nuisance did not arise out of
negligence. De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury, 59 A.2d 800, 804-05(Conn. 1948).
5. 'There has been forgetfulness at times that the forms of actions
have been abolished.... Very often the sufferer is at liberty to give
his complaint either one label or the other. It would be intolerable
if the choice of a name were to condition liability." McFarlane v.
Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 345, 160 N. E. 391, 392 (1928).
6. Compare McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E.
391 (1928), with Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29
A.2d 775 (1948). Compare Dygert v. Schenk, 23 Wend. 446 (N. Y.
1840), with Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 (Mass. 1824). Compare Hoff-
man v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499 (1931), with Johnson v.
City of Alcoa, 24 Tenn. App. 411, 145 S. W.2d 796 (1940). Compare
Albee v. Chappaqua Shoe Mfg. Co., 16 N. Y. S. 687 (1891), with Fort
Wayne Cooperage Co. v. Page, 170 Ind. 585, 84 N. E. 145 (1908). Nor
is the situation peculiar to the United States: Compare 'Ware v.
Garston Haulage Co., Ltd., [1944] 1 K. B. 30, with Maitland v. Rais-
beck & Hewitt, Ltd., [1944] 1 K. B. 689. And see Notes, 96 L. J. 225(1946), 7 MOD. L. R. 155 (1944).
7. See Winfield, Nuisance As a Tort, 4 CAME. L. J. 189 (1931),
for a historical survey of nuisance.
8. Id. at 190; PROSSER, TORTS 573.
9. STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
105 (1890); PROSSER, TORTS 566.
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nuisance, if it can properly be characterized as a nuisance
at all. Public nuisance was and is a catch-all phrase for
various petty crimes. 10 It is well established that no private
action accrues to an individual for infringement by a public
nuisance upon his general rights as a member of the public."
However, it was held in 1536, that an action on the case
would lie by one who could prove damage beyond or differ-
ent from that suffered by the community as a whole.' 2 Nor
was it necessary that the public nuisance should have become
a private one as to the plaintiff; the action would lie for
injury to person or chattel completely unconnected with the
use or enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. 13
Nuisance is a term descriptive of a type of damage sus-
tained, the invasion of a particular interest, and does not
describe the type of conduct which leads to the damage or
invasion.'4  In determining whether a nuisance exists, the
relevant inquiry is whether a certain condition has been
created, not how it was created. Before negligence emerged
as a separate tort, it is probable that an action on the case
for damages resulting from a public nuisance could have
been proved and decided merely upon a showing that de-
fendant's act had created the condition and that plaintiff
had suffered special injury. While it may have been neces-
sary that defendant's conduct could be characterized as
"wrongful," it seems safe to say that it was irrelevant
10. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 233 (8th ed. 1934) ; 2 RUSSELL, CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS 1691 (8th ed. 1923).
11. Scheible v. Law, 65 Ind. 332 (1879); Bouquet v. Hackensack
Water Co., 90 N. J. L. 203, 101 Ati. 379 (1916); PROSSER, TORTS 570;
HARPER, TORTS § 179 (1933); SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 293 (9th ed.
1936).
12. "If one makes a ditch across the highway, and I come riding
in my way by night, and I and my horse are thrown into the ditch,
so that I suffer great damage . . . in this case I shall have an action
against him who made the ditch across the way, because I am more
damaged by this than any other," Y. B. Mich. 27 Hen. VIII, pl. 10
(1536), also reported in 8 HOLDWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
424 (1926). See also Williams Case, Co. Rep. 72b, 77 Eng. Rep. 163
(1592); Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 446, 79 Eng. Rep. 382 (1618);
Benjamin v. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 400 (1874) ; cases cited note 11 supra.
13. Leahan v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 60 N. E. 382 (1901); Sim-
mons v. Everson, 124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891); Downes v.
Silva, 57 R. I. 343, 190 Atl. 42 (1937) ; Y. B. Mich. 27 Hen. VIII, pl. 10
(1536), also reported in 8 HOLDWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
424 (1926); PROSSER, TORTS 570; 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, SCOPE AND
INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTER 40, 215-25, esp. 217-18 (1939).
14. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO
CHAPTER 40, 215-25, esp. 220-22 (1939) ; PROSSER, TORTS 553.
[Vol. 24
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whether the wrongfulness consisted of negligent, ultra-
hazardous, or intentional conduct.1 Contributory negligence,
not yet being conceived, was, of course, equally irrelevant.
Complicating factors arose, however when negligence
emerged as a separate tort.16 Unless negligence supplanted
and replaced some of the other forms of action on the case,
it is clear that either an action on the case for negligence
or the older private action on the case for a public nuisance
would sometimes lie for a single injury. Assuming that
either action would lie, it might be argued that con-
tributory negligence would be a defense to the former, but
not to the latter.'Y However, the case of Butterfield v. For-
rester18 would seem conclusively to have negatived such an.
argument. In that case, plaintiff was injured when he rode
his horse into a barricade placed in the road by the defend-
ant. In holding for defendant in an action termed "an
action on the case for obstructing a highway," the court said,
"One person being in fault will not dispense with another
using ordinary care for himself."' 9 Not only did the case
introduce the doctrine of contributory- negligence into tort
law, by coincidence it also involved the classic example of a
15. Under medieval concepts of tort liability a person acted at his
peril and it was completely irrelevant whether the person inflicting
the harm was at "fault." 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
446-82 (1926); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to aid others as a Basis of
Tort Liability, 56 U. OF PA. L. REV. 217, 221 (1908); PROSSER, TORTS
19; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908). But cf. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW, Lecture III (1881). The development away from
this early concept has been so gradual and unsteady that it is often
impossible to say with any degree of exactitude what the state of
the law was at a particular time. See PROSSER, TORTS 427; Isaacs,
Fault and Liability, 31 HA~v. L. REV. 954 (1918). The older theory
survived longer in possessory actions such as trespass and probably
in private nuisance. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITIES, 19
(1906); PROSSER, TORTS 76-78. What the theoretical basis of liability
was for either a public or a private nuisance during the period just
prior to the emergence of negligence as a separate tort is difficult to
ascertain. Possibly one of the reasons why some courts still refuse
the defense.of contributory negligence to an action phrased in terms
of nuisance is the carrying over of the medieval concept of liability
without fault (or of some intermediate mutation of that concept) into
the present-day law.
16. No certain date can be set, as this legal phenomenon occurred
gradually over the space of roughly one hundred years. However, for
convenience the date is usually set as (circa) 1825. See Winfield,
The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L. Q. REV. 184, 195(1926).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
19. Id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
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public nuisance-an obstruction in a highway.20  Neither
"nuisance" nor "negligence" was -mentioned by the court, but,
unless the choice of labels is to determine the result of an
action, the Butterfield case stands for the proposition that
contributory negligence is a defense to an action for damages
resulting from a public nuisance brought about by negligent
conduct. Anomalously, however, while the courts have gen-
erally accepted contributory negligence as a defense to an
action for negligence, its application to an action phrased in
terms of nuisance has been far from uniform.21
It is apparent that the key to the problem of the avail-
ability of the defense of contributory negligence in actions
for injuries to person or chattels arising out of nuisance should
be the determination of the type of conduct bringing the nuis-
ance about, i.e., whether the nuisance was caused by negligence
or by some other type of tortious conduct. In McFarlane v. Ni-
agara FallS, 22 Chief Judge Cardozo used this analysis in decid-
ing a case arising out of injury resulting from a defectively
constructed sidewalk. He made it clear that contributory neg-
ligence is a defense if the conduct out of which the nuisance
arose is actionable only because it is negligent.2 3 But some
conduct, he said, is "wrongful" whether or not it can be
characterized as negligent.2 4  Judge Cardozo did not define
the word "wrongful" but if he meant conduct usually de-
scribed as ultra-hazardous his analysis would be doctrinally
sound.25 Strict liability (i.e., liability without proof of negli-
20. See McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 348, 160 N. E.
391, 393 (1928); Note, 29 ILL. L. REV. 372, 373 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS
568-69.
21. Compare McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E.
391 (1928), with Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.
2d 775 (1948). Compare Dygert v. Schenk, 23 Wend. 446 (N. Y. 1840),
with Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 (Mass. 1824). Compare Johnson v.
City of Alcoa, 24 Tenn. App. 411, 145 S. W.2d 796 (1940), with Albee
v. Chappaqua Shoe Mfg. Co., 16 N. Y. S. 687 (1891). Authorities main-
taining that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action for
nuisance are SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 157 (6th ed. 1913) ;
JoYcE, NUISANCES § 45 (1906); Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMB.
L. J. 189 (1931). Contra: PROSSER, TORTS 597; Notes, 29 ILL. L. REV.
372 (1935), 23 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1935), 35 MICH. L. REv. 684 (1937).
22. 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391 (1928).
23. Id. at 344, 160 N. E. at 392.
24. Id. at 343, 160 N. E. at 391.
25. It is also possible that by "wrongful" Judge Cardozo may have
meant "conduct in violation of a statute," which might result in a find-
ing of negligence per se without any inquiry as to whether negli-
gence in fact existed. See Morris, The Reltion of Criminal Statutes
to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933). However, by interpret-
[Vol. 24
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gence) attaches to ultra-hazardous conduct if engaged in
without a license, 26 and contributory negligence is not a de-
fense.27 Judge Cardozo termed a nuisance resulting from
this type of conduct an "absolute nuisance," and although
intimating that contributory negligence might not constitute
a defense to an action for damages resulting from the exist-
ence of such a nuisance, he specifically reserved the ques-
tion.28
In Hoffman v. BristolD the Connecticut court decided the
question left open by Judge Cardozo, holding that contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense to an action for damages
resulting from an "absolute nuisance." If the term' "abso-
lute nuisance" had been defined by that court to mean one
arising from ultra-hazardous or intentional conduct this
reasoning cannot be criticized. 30
The Hoffman case, however, sowed the seeds of an un-
usual definition of "absolute nuisance" which resulted in the
court's holding in the De Lahunta case that when conditions
which are subsequently found to constitute a nuisance are
intentionally created, the nuisance is "not one arising out of
negligence," i.e., is an absolute one. "Intentionally" was
defined as having the novel meaning "not that a wrong or
ing "wrongful" to mean "ultra-hazardous conduct," the analysis is
the same as that used in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, i.e., the funda-
mental bases of tort liability are three types of conduct: intentional,
negligent, and ultra-hazardous. 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 6 (1934).
Dean Prosser also uses this analysis. PRossER, TORTS 34, 35.
26. Thus in Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52 (1880), plaintiff fell
into a coal hole which defendant had constructed in the street. The
court held that defendant was strictly liable because he had failed to
plead a license from the city. If defendant had established the issuance
of a license, the court went on to say by way of dictum, he would
have been liable only on a showing of negligence.
27. Muller v. McKeeson, 73 N. Y. 195 (1878). On the other hand
voluntary assumption of risk is a defense to liability based on ultra-
hazardous conduct. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 118 Atl. 467 (1922);
Thompson v. Petrozzello, 5 N. J. Misc. 645, 137 Atl. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ;
Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868); PROSSER, TORTS 463-64;
HARPER, TORTS § 164. In McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340,
160 N. E. 391 (1928), Chief Judge Cardozo, after noting that a nuisance
existed in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926(1809), said: "Very likely the breadth of its pronouncement calls for
revision and restriction .... In nuisance of that order, the fault that
bars recovery is fault so extreme as to be equivalent to invitation of
injury or, at least, indifference to consequences."
28. McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 350, 160 N. E. 391,
393 (1928).
29. 113 Conn. 386, 155 AtI. 499 (1931).
30. See note 25 mpra.
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the existence of a nuisance was intended, but that the cre-
ator of [it] intended to bring about the conditions which
are in fact found to be a nuisance."3' 1 The result of the
court's test is to give to the concept of negligence a double
meaning; it will signify one thing when the action is called
"negligence" and something else when the label "nuisance" is
attached to the action. For "intent" in the sense of "voli-
tion" does not draw the boundary line between negligent
and intentional conduct in the general law of torts. Conduct
is 'often negligent and at the same time volitional; in fact,
negligent misfeasances occupy the greater part of the negli-
gence field.3 2 Under the court's test, however, strict liability
will attach to any volitional act the result of which can be
tagged with the label "nuisance," and neither negligence nor
contributory negligence will be relevant except where the
conduct is non-volitional. Neither the McFarlane case nor
the accepted principles of tort law compel or countenance
such a result.
It may nevertheless be insisted that the court in the
De Lahunta case reached the right result for the wrong
reason, i.e., that the city was engaged in "ultra-hazardous"
conduct to which strict liability attached, and therefore that
even though negligence existed in fact, its existence was ir-
relevant to liability33 But it has been generally held that
31. De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury, 59 A.2d 800, 802 (Conn.
1948). The definition in these terms was first phrased in Beckwith
v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 511, 29 A.2d 775, 777 (1942).
32. Negligence may consist of either a voluntary physical act (mis-
feasance) or a failure to act (nonfeasance). 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS§ 284. Intent in the law of torts today means that the actor acts for
the purpose of causing an invasion of another's interest or knows that
the invasion is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his
conduct. It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally (volition-
ally) done. I Id. § 13 comment d. ". . . the mere knowledge and
appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equiva-
lent of intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness
that he is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be
negligent ... but it is not classed as an intentional wrong." PROSSER,
TORTS 42. See also Louisville and S. I. T. Co. v. Jennings, 73 Ind.
App. 69, 75, 123 N. E. 835, 837-8 (1919); Pickett v. Waldorf System,
241 Mass. 569, 136 N. E. 64, 65 (1922); Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St.
59, 133 N. E. 85, 89 (1921); Goff v. Emde, 132 Ohio App. 216, 167
N. E. 699, 700 (1928).
33. Where carrying on of ultra-hazardous activity is the basis of
liability ". . . negligence, in the ordinary sense, is not the ground of
liability. . . ." Muller v. McKeeson, 73 N. Y. 195 (1878). ". . . one
who carries on an ultra-hazardous activity is liable . . . although the
utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 519 (1938). This seems to be the theory used by the English courts
in deciding a number of cases involving injuries suffered from ob-
[Vol. 24
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the placing of an obstruction in the street under a valid
license is not actionable unless negligence is shown.34 It is
clear that a city acting within the scope of its statutory power
should be in no worse position than its licensee.3 5  Neither
should be liable unless some phase of the conduct can be
characterized as negligent.3' Certainly the city's conduct was
not intentional in the accepted tort sense. While such activity
could be considered to have the attributes of ultra-hazardous
conduct in the absence of any right to obstruct the highway,
a municipality has such a right.37 It follows that negligence
is the only sound basis of liability, and that contributory
negligence should be a defense. Nothing is gained by use
of the term "nuisance." Reasoning which reaches an op-
posite result is clearly untenable.
It has been pointed out above that the basic source of
confusion in the negligence-nuisance area lies in the fact
that the common law background has often blinded courts
to the realization that negligence by any other name should
still have the same consequences. But there is an additional
source of confusion arising from a failure to differentiate
structions placed in the streets by private individuals. Ware v.
Garston Haulage Co., Ltd., [1944] 1 K. B. 30; Maitland v. Raisbeck
& Hewitto Ltd., [1944] 1 K. B. 689; Wing v. London General Omnibus
Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 652; See Notes, 96 L. J. 225 (1946), 7 MOD. L. REV.
155 (1944).
34. Houston v. Town of Waverly, 225 Ala. 98, 142 So. 80 (1932);
McKenna v. Andreassi, 292 Mass. 213, 197 N. E. 879 (1935); Aristos
v. Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co., 258 Mich. 579 242 N. W. 757 (1932);
Kelly v. Doody, 116 N. Y. 575, 22 N. E. 1084 (1889) ; Clifford v. Dam,
81 N. Y. 52 (1880). When that which would otherwise constitute a
nuisance is specifically authorized by statute, it loses its character
as a nuisance. HARPER, TORTS § 189.
35. In England it seems to be clear that negligence must be shown
when an action is brought against a municipality for obstructions in
the street, nuisance being irrelevant. Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood
Urban District Council, [1945] 1 K. B. 584; Jelley v. Ilford Borough
Council, [1941] 2 All E. R. 468; Note, 96 L. J. 127, 142 (1946).
36. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 521, which states that strict liability
"does not apply if the activity is carried on in pursuance of a public
duty imposed upon the actor as a public officer or employee," would
seem to apply with equal force to a municipality.
37. Municipalities are subdivisions of the state with delegated
powers and functions. Among these are the regulations of traffic,
safety, etc., which include erection and maintenance of traffic lights,
safety zone markers, etc. City of Valparaiso v. Spaeth, 166 Ind. 14, 76 N.
E. 514 (1905) ; Lacey v. Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 121 N. W. 542 (1909) ;
Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Ore. 79, 60 Pac. 390 (1900). Strict
liability is applied only to conduct considered to be ultra-hazardous;
the existence of intent and negligence is irrelevant. To hold the city
strictly liable in damage cases involving these governmental functions
would, in effect, make it an insurer. See notes 35 and '36 supra.
1949]
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between the doctrines applicable to the different present-day
remedies for nuisance. In an action to enjoin a nuisance,
the type of conduct which created the nuisance is as irrele-
vant today as it was at early common law; the sole inquiry
is whether a nuisance exists. The same is true as to a
criminal prosecution for public nuisance, except to the ex-
tent that mens rea may be a requisite of the crime. And
mens rea involves conceptions of intent materially different
from the concept of intent in tort law.38
The need for a complete analysis and re-evaluation of
the concept of nuisance is apparent. Enough has been said
to demonstrate that to attach the label of nuisance to the
remedy of damages for injuries to person or chattels is to
invite confusion. The De Lahunta case is a striking example.3 9
Such cases can and should be decided by the general rules
38. The court's definition of "intent" in the De Lahunta case, while
completely untenable from a tort point of view (see note 32 supra),
would have been entirely adequate to describe the intent necessary to
support a criminal action for public nuisance. For definitions of Vcns
rea, see Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 96 (1945); Ellis v.
United States, 206 U. S. 246, 257; HALL, GENERAL PRINcIPLEs OF
CRIMINAL LAW 138-68, esp. 148-49 (1947). Whether the Connecticut
doctrine, as exemplified by the De Lahunta case, had its origin in con-
fusion with criminal law concepts is, of course, conjectural. But the
possibility is obvious.
39. Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775(1942), is, perhaps, an even more striking example. For an example
of the doctrinal gymnastics through which its conception of nuisance
has put the Conecticut court, see Hill v. Way, 117 Conn. 358, 168 AtI.
1 (1933), overruled by Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, supra.
Two possible factors may have influenced the Connecticut court
in the development of this doctrine. First, it may share in the increas-
ing dissatisfaction with the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L. J. 674 (1934); Mole and
Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORN. L. Q. 333, 604(1932): Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 476 (1936); PRossER, TORTS 403.
Second, many municipal activities have been regarded in Connecticut
as governmental functions to which tort immunity attaches. An ex-
ception to this immunity, however, is nuisance. This has resulted in
the Connecticut court's (and other courts in the same situation) at-
tempting to separate negligence and nuisance. The attempt has created
nothing but confusion as the separation cannot be made. Certainly
if the court is trying to avoid the outmoded governmental immunity
doctrine and the hardships of contributory negligence a clear holding
to that effect would be more desirable than retreat behind an unsound
theory. The attempt to escape from the governmental immunity doc-
trine, while applicable to some of the previous cases in this line (e.g.,
Hoffman v. Bristol, note 2 supra) has no relevance to the De Lahunta
case as a Connecticut statute provides for recovery against the munici-
pality for defects in the streets, CONN, GEN. STAT. § 2126 (1949).
[Vol. 24
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of torts applicable to injuries to person and chattels, without
any reference whatever to nuisance concepts. 40
40. While this note has been concerned primarily with injuries to
person and chattels resulting from public nuisances, it would seem
that the conclusions apply equally to actions for injuries to person and
chattels caused by a private nuisance. In neither case is it doctrinally
unsound to talk in terms of nuisance if the courts could avoid being
confused by its use and would not use it as a catch-word to avoid a
difficult problem. Courts have strained and warped the concept of
private nuisance, originally only an interference with the use and en-joyment of land, to give members of the owner's family a remedy for
personal injuries. Hosmer v. Republic Iron and Steel Co. 179 Ala. 415,
60 So. 801 (1913); Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Glen, 97 Tex. 586, 80
S. W. 992 (1904). The simple solution would be to recognize the fact
that an independent tort action for invasion of an individual's right
in the physical integrity of his person exists over and above the
private nuisance. See PROSSER, TORTS 577; 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTER 40, 215-25, esp. 219-20. This
solution would seem to apply equally well whether the action is brought
by tl~h owner of land or by a member of his household or family. Com-
pare Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., 54 F.2d 510 (1931),
with French v. Center Creek Powder Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 22f, 158
S. W. 723 (1913). Compare Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's
Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N. E. 528 (1899), with Kerbough
v. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 194 (3rd Cir. 1907).
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